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Abstract 
This paper revisits the events of the 1980s bubble in Japan in light of the lessons 
learned from the subprime crisis in the United States.  Our focus is on the role 
played by sectoral developments in the financial system in Japan.  We highlight 
the transformation of a subset of non-financial firms (the large manufacturing 
firms) from being net debtors to the banks to becoming net creditors to the banks, 
thereby becoming part of the financial intermediary sector.  In this way, large 
manufacturing firms in Japan played the role of surrogate wholesale banks that 
increased the overall supply of credit to the economy.  When good borrowers 
already had credit and yet loose monetary conditions encouraged greater credit 
supply, credit availability to marginal borrowers and to real estate-related sectors 
increased.  We discuss the role of market conditions and monetary policy in this 
development. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Financial booms and busts are complex phenomena that defy a simple explanation.  The 
fact that such booms and busts have taken place throughout history even as financial 
institutions and instruments have undergone very dramatic changes over the centuries 
should give us pause for thought before assigning blame to any particular feature or set of 
economic developments in place at the time. 
 
The global financial crisis that started with the subprime mortgage crisis in the United 
States in the summer of 2007 gained further momentum in 2008, engulfing not only other 
developed countries in Europe and elsewhere, but spreading its influence to emerging 
market economies also.  The lessons that we are learning from the current global 
financial crisis provide valuable insights with which to revisit past episodes of financial 
booms and busts.  In particular, the US mortgage crisis provides many lessons on the role 
of financial innovation and the importance of the increased supply of credit that results 
from securitization and the tapping of new sources of funding beyond the traditional 
deposit funding for the banking sector.  Whereas retail deposits were the traditional 
funding source for the bank-based financial system, the shift to a market-based financial 
system and the securitization of financial claims enables the tapping of new sources of 
funding for the banking sector – both domestic and foreign. 
 
In this paper, we offer a re-assessment of the financial boom that took place in Japan in 
the late 1980s in the light of the lessons learned from the subprime crisis in the United 
States.  The empirical features of the 1980s bubble that we draw attention to have been 
discussed by others before us.
1  Our contribution is to gather them in a financial system 
perspective where the interlocking balance sheets of banks and non-financial firms are 
considered as a unified whole.   
 
In the US subprime crisis, understanding the role of securitization in opening up new 
sources of funding is important in understanding the overall increase in mortgage funding 
to household borrowers.  As we will see below, securitization enabled the increased 
funding to US households by increasing the overall leverage of the US financial system 
as a whole.  In the case of Japan in the 1980s, our particular focus is on corporate lending 
following the sectoral changes that took place in Japan after the liberalization of both 
securities markets and the rules governing bank deposits.  
 
Securities markets enabled the opening up of new funding sources – both domestic and 
foreign – away from traditional retail deposits.  We highlight the role played by a subset 
of non-financial firms: the large manufacturing firms in Japan.  As recently as the early 
1980s, manufacturing firms in Japan received virtually all of their financing from the 
banking system, both for long-term investment as well as for short-term liquidity needs.  
However, with the liberalization of the securities market that began in the mid-1980s, 
non-financial companies were able to tap new sources of funding from outside the 
traditional banking sector.  New stock, corporate bonds, warrants and commercial paper 
                                                 
1  For example, Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2003), Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001), 
Posen (2000) among others.   2
(CP) increasingly became important sources of funding for non-financial firms.  The new 
funding was supplied by domestic savers and other non-leveraged financial institutions 
such as life insurance companies who purchased the bonds and other securities issued by 
Japanese companies.  Foreign investors also figured among the new funding sources. 
 
As new funding sources opened up, it became profitable for non-financial firms to act as 
financial intermediaries by raising funding in the capital markets through securities, and 
then supplying the new funds raised to the banking system by means of newly introduced 
time deposits with liberalized interest rates.  The financial assets of non-financial 
corporations increased dramatically together with their financial liabilities in the late 
1980s.  For a brief period in the late 1980s, the financial assets of non-financial 
companies overtook their financial liabilities.   
 
In this way, the non-financial companies became de facto financial intermediaries.  They 
became financial intermediaries that drew market-based finance and supplied financing to 
the banking system by holding large deposit claims on the banks.   
 
From the banks’ point of view, such a development was a double blow.  First, they lost 
their traditional customers – their traditional corporate borrowers.  Second, they had to 
deploy their newly acquired funding from corporate deposits.  Hence, the banks were 
under an even greater imperative to expand their lending to new borrowers.  Not only had 
they lost their traditional corporate borrowers, there was a reversal of roles in which the 
corporate borrowers became creditors to the banks.  They become depositors who 
supplied additional funding that needed to be lent out.   
 
The imperative to expand lending meant that Japanese banks had to lower their lending 
standards in order to find new borrowers.  Increasingly, such borrowers were the less 
credit worthy firms such as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that were 
previously shut out of the credit market, and toward borrowers that relied on real estate 
collateral.  As real estate lending increased, the property bubble gained impetus.  Once 
the structural shift had taken place toward greater credit supply to real estate-based 
lending, the familiar property boom took hold. 
 
In the rest of this paper, we will outline the argument in more detail.  We begin with a 
conceptual framework that allows us to quantify the total credit supply to an economy by 
tracing the role of financial intermediaries in an interlocking system of creditor-debtor 
relationships.  The overall supply of credit in a financial system should be seen as the 
outcome of many interrelated decisions of financial intermediaries in the system. 
 
We then outline the empirical evidence on the broad sectoral developments in the 
Japanese financial system in the 1980s, as well as chart the role played by particular 
epochs of financial liberalization.  We highlight in particular, the importance of securities 
markets, and the role played by new securities in tapping sources of financing that were 
traditionally off limits to borrowers and the role played by newly introduced time 
deposits with liberalized interest rates that helped banks to expand their liability size. 
   3
Through this exercise, we can point to several points of similarity between the US 
mortgage boom that led up to the crisis of 2007/2008 and the 1980s bubble in Japan.  In 
particular, the following parallels are striking: 
 
•  In both cases, new securities increased the supply of overall credit to the economy 
through the tapping of new credit sources.  In the US mortgage crisis, the new 
securities were mortgage-backed securities issued by the US government 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), as well as by the private-label mortgage pools that 
contained subprime mortgages.  In the 1980s bubble in Japan, the new securities 
were corporate bonds, warrants and CP issued by Japanese non-financial 
companies.   
•  In both cases, non-leveraged purchasers of the new securities were important new 
funding sources.  In the US mortgage crisis, foreigners (especially foreign central 
banks) bought the mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) of the US GSEs.  In the 
1980s bubble in Japan, non-leveraged institutions such as life insurance 
companies and foreign investors were the buyers of Japanese corporate 
securities.
2 
•  In both cases, the expansion of credit provided by the commercial banking sector 
received impetus from the integration of the commercial banking sector with the 
capital markets.  In the US mortgage crisis, although it did not become obvious 
until the end of the financial boom, the balance sheet expansion of commercial 
banks occurred in tandem with market-based credit and the associated expansion 
of the balance sheets of investment banks.  In the 1980s bubble, the balance sheet 
expansion of commercial banks was closely related to that of large non-financial 
firms that raised funds by tapping capital markets. 
   
However, there are also important differences between the US mortgage boom and bust 
and the 1980s bubble in Japan: 
 
•  In the US mortgage crisis, the borrowers were households, while in the 1980s 
bubble in Japan, the borrowers were companies. 
•  In the US mortgage crisis, the new securities were primarily debt securities that 
enabled the financial system as a whole to become more leveraged.  In the 1980s 
bubble in Japan, the credit boom coincided with a boom in the stock market so 
that a large proportion of the securities were equity issues and the leverage of the 
banking sector actually declined. 
 
The importance of securities funding and the role of market-based financial instruments 
points to the importance of monetary policy in determining the overall tenor of financial 
market conditions and the credit spreads that sharpen the incentives of market players.   
This is because the incentives that govern funding and lending are ultimately driven by 
                                                 
2  In the Flow of Funds Accounts Statistics, the prime holders of securities issued by non-financial firms in 
the late 1980s were foreigners categorized as “Overseas”.  However, we should be careful in interpreting 
statistics for “Overseas” because the amounts held by foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms are also 
included in this category.   4
market prices.  We return to this issue later in our paper, when we comment on the 




2.  Financial System Perspective: Theory and Recent US Case 
 
A simplified analytical framework for our analysis can be given in the diagram below.  
The financial intermediary sector channels funds from equity holders and ultimate 
lenders (“outside claim holders”) to the ultimate users of those funds (“end-user 
borrowers”).   
 
The identity of the end-user borrowers depends on the particular case studied.  In the US 
mortgage boom and bust, the end-user borrowers are households who have borrowed to 
buy residential property.   In the case of the 1980s bubble in Japan, the group of 















The constituents of the financial intermediary sector itself will depend on the context.  
For the US mortgage boom and subsequent crisis, the intermediary sector includes the 
originating banks, but also includes the entities such as the GSEs and GSE mortgage 
pools that were involved in the securitization process.   
 
In the case of the 1980s bubble in Japan, the financial intermediary sector includes the 
banking system as a whole, but we will argue below that non-financial companies 
became incorporated as part of the financial intermediary sector. 
 
Irrespective of the context, at the aggregate sector level (i.e., once the claims and 
obligations between leveraged entities have been netted out), the lending to ultimate 
borrowers must be funded either from the equity of the intermediary sector or by 
borrowing from creditors outside the intermediary sector.  To see this, consider a 
simplified balance sheet of an individual bank, as follows: 
    5
Assets Liabilities
Individual bank
Loans to firms, 
households








By “bank” we mean any leveraged institution that could be construed as part of the 
financial intermediary sector.  In the US context, the “banking system” therefore denotes 
the whole of the leveraged financial sector, which includes the traditional commercial 
banking sector, but also encompasses leveraged institutions such as investment banks, 
hedge funds and (in the United States especially) the government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  When we aggregate across banks, all the 
claims and obligations across banks cancel out.  So, the aggregate balance sheet for the 





Liabilities to non-banks 






In other words, aggregate lending to end-user borrowers by the banking system must be 
financed either by the equity in the banking system or by borrowing from creditors 
outside the banking system.  For any fixed profile of equity and leverage across 
individual banks, the total supply of credit to ultimate borrowers is larger when the banks 
borrow more from creditors outside the banking system.  Put differently, the leverage of 
the financial sector is increasing as banks increase the proportion of their funding that 
comes from creditors outside the banking sector.
3 
 
Indeed, it is possible to derive a formula based on accounting identities alone (see Shin 
(2008)) in which the total lending to ultimate borrowers can be written as a function of 
the profile of equity, leverage and funding source of the individual financial 
intermediaries.  In particular, when we denote: 
 
i y :  lending of bank i to ultimate borrowers plus holding of real assets 
i e :  equity of bank i  
                                                 
3  See Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008).   6
i λ :  leverage of bank i (ratio of total assets to equity) 
i z :  proportion of bank i’s funding that comes from outside the banking system 
 
Then, the sum of i y  across all banks (i.e., total lending to ultimate borrows plus holding 
of real assets) can be written as: 
 




i z e y λ  
 
In the appendix to the paper, we derive the above formula.  The point to emphasize here 
is that the zi terms are crucial in determining aggregate lending to end-users.  Note that zi 
refers to the proportion of funding that comes from sources outside the banking sector.  
Even if we fix the leverage profile of individual banks, a shift in the funding source of 
those banks toward greater use of non-leveraged claim holders would increase the total 
supply of lending to end user borrowers.   
 
One way in which zi can increase is when banks issue securities which are then bought by 
non-leveraged institutions, such as mutual funds or insurance companies.  In a traditional 
banking system that intermediates between retail depositors and ultimate borrowers, the 
total quantity of deposits represents the obligation of the banking system to creditors 
outside the banking system.  However, securitization opens up potentially new sources of 
funding for the banking system by tapping new creditors.  The new creditors are those 
who buy mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), claims that are written on MBSs such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and (one step removed) those who buy the asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) that are ultimately backed by CDOs and MBSs.  The 
new creditors who buy the securitized claims include pension funds, mutual funds and 
insurance companies, as well as foreign investors such as foreign central banks.  Foreign 
central banks have been a particularly important funding source for residential mortgage 
lending in the United States. 
 
Although securitization may facilitate greater credit supply to ultimate borrowers at the 
aggregate level, the choice to supply credit is taken by the constituents of the banking 
system taken as a whole.  For a financial intermediary, its return on equity is magnified 
by leverage.  To the extent that it wishes to maximize its return on equity, it will attempt 
to maintain the highest level of leverage consistent with limits set by creditors (for 
instance, through the “haircuts” on repurchase agreements).  As measured risk fluctuates, 
so will leverage itself.  In benign financial market conditions when measured risks are 
low, financial intermediaries expand balance sheets as they increase leverage.   
Securitization enables the tapping of new creditors, thereby increasing the proportion of 
the banks’ funding that comes from creditors outside the banking sector.  In this way, the 
leverage of the banking sector as a whole increases. 
 
Although the intermediary could increase leverage in other ways – for instance, returning 
equity to shareholders or buying back equity by issuing long-term debt – the evidence 
suggests that they tend to keep equity intact and adjust the size of total assets (see Adrian 
and Shin (2007, 2008)).   7
As balance sheets expand, new borrowers must be found.  When all prime borrowers 
have a mortgage, but still balance sheets need to expand, then banks have to lower their 
lending standards in order to lend to subprime borrowers.  The seeds of the subsequent 
downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown. 
 
When the downturn arrives, the bad loans are either sitting on the balance sheets of the 
large financial intermediaries, or they are in special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that the 
financial intermediaries sponsor.  This is so, since the bad loans were taken on precisely 
in order to utilize the slack on their balance sheets.  Although final investors such as 
pension funds and insurance companies will suffer losses, too, the large financial 
intermediaries are more exposed in the sense that they face the danger of seeing their 
capital wiped out.  The severity of the credit crisis of 2007/2008 lies precisely in the fact 
that the bad loans were not all passed on to final investors.  Instead, the “hot potato” sits 
inside the financial system, on the balance sheet of the largest and most sophisticated 
financial intermediaries. 
 
A complete disaggregation of the funding source for the banking sector is not possible 
due to the lack of detailed breakdowns in the data between funding from leveraged and 
unleveraged creditors.  However, we can gain glimpses from different perspectives.  One 
way is to examine the identity of the holders of US agency and GSE-backed securities.   
 
 


































The above figure plots the total holdings of US agency and GSE-backed securities broken 
down according to the identity of the creditor.  The data are from the US Flow of Funds 
Accounts (table L.210).  Leveraged financial institutions include commercial banks, 
broker dealers and other securitization vehicles.  The non-leveraged financial institutions 
include mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds.  The “non-financial 
sector” includes household, corporate and government sectors.  Finally, the “rest of the 
Source:  Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve.   8
world” category indicates foreign creditors, especially foreign central banks or other 
official sector holders.  The figure below charts the holders by percentage holdings.   
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The key series for our illustration is the proportion held by other entities than leveraged 
financial institutions.  US leveraged institutions have been holding a declining proportion 
of the total.  At the end of 2002, leveraged financial institutions held 48.4% of the total, 
but by the end of 2007, that percentage had dropped to 36.7%.  There has been a 
consequent increase in the funding provided by the non-leveraged sector.  Notably, the 
holdings of the “rest of the world” category (which itself is mostly accounted for by 
foreign central banks) have more than tripled from $504 billion at the end of 2001 to 
$1,540 billion at the end of 2007.  In this sense, foreign creditors have been an 
increasingly important funding source for residential mortgage lending in the United 
States. 
 
According to the picture painted here, the subprime crisis has its origin in the increased 
supply of loans – or equivalently, in the imperative to find new assets to fill the 
expanding balance sheets.  In this way, it is possible to explain two features of the 
subprime crisis: first, why apparently sophisticated financial intermediaries continued to 
lend to borrowers of dubious creditworthiness, and second, why such sophisticated 
financial intermediaries held the bad loans on their own balance sheets, rather than 
passing them on to other unsuspecting investors.  Both facts are explained by the 







Source:  Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve.   9
3.  Financing of Non-Financial Companies under Financial Liberalization: Japan’s 
Bubble Case 
    
As with the mortgage boom in the United States, the 1980s bubble in Japan is also linked 
with the development of securities markets as a funding source.  The corporate bond 
market had started in the late 1970s, but was initially off-limits to most firms due to strict 
qualifying standards.  However, during the 1980s, the corporate bond market became 
increasingly accessible.   
 
In 1979, issuing of unsecured bonds and convertible bonds were permitted, but the 
criteria were so stringent that only two companies in Japan qualified (Toyota Auto and 
Matsushita Electric).  However, by 1988, the number of firms qualifying for unsecured 
straight bonds increased to approximately 300, while the number of firms qualifying for 
convertible bonds increased to around 500.
4  Also, starting in 1987, the issuing of CP 
(unsecured short-term liabilities) was permitted for Japanese firms for the first time.   
 
As a result of the opening up of market-based funding for non-financial companies, the 
relationship between the banking system and the non-financial company sector 
underwent a fundamental shift in the late 1980s.  A subset of the non-financial companies 
– especially the large manufacturing firms – ceased to rely on bank financing, and tapped 
the capital markets instead. 
 
Even more significantly, the non-financial companies that had good access to market 
financing raised surplus funding from the markets, and then deposited the surplus in the 
banking system in the form of time deposits with liberalized interest rates that attracted 
high rates of interest.  The time deposits with liberalized interest rates were introduced in 
the process of financial liberalization in 1985.
 5  In effect, the non-financial companies 
transformed their roles vis-à-vis the banking system.  They went from being a debtor to 
the banks to becoming a creditor to the banks.   
 
The implications for the total supply of credit to the economy as a whole can be seen 
from the equation: 
 
() () 1 1
1 1








i z e y λ  
 
The non-financial firms in effect became integrated into the financial system by 
intermediating between the capital market and the banking sector.  The number of banks 
in the intermediary sector (given by n) increased.  They borrowed from the capital 
markets by issuing bonds, or raised new equity by issuing new stock.  Then, they 
supplied this funding to the banking system by depositing the proceeds in the banks. 
Ultimately, these deposits would be matched by assets on the banks’ balance sheets. 
                                                 
4  Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, p. 229-230). 
5  The role played by time deposits with liberalized interest rates in the flow of funds was significant.  This 
was not only because the financial product yielded competitive market interest rates, but also because it had 
flexible terms above the regulated minimum term.  We discuss their role in detail in a later section.   10
Just as the US mortgage boom relied on high values of zi in the equation above, the 1980s 
bubble in Japan rested on the appearance of new financial intermediaries who funded 
themselves by tapping the capital markets, and who supplied funds to the banking sector 
in the form of newly liberalized bank deposits.  The new funding came ultimately from 
non-leveraged institutions such as life insurance companies and foreign investors.
6   
 
The diagram below illustrates the main structural change.  A subset of non-financial firms 
(depicted by the colored rectangle in the diagram) underwent a transformation in its 
relationship vis-à-vis the financial intermediary sector.  Whereas previously it was a 
borrower from the intermediary sector, the firms underwent a reversal of roles, to become 
net creditors to the banks, thereby becoming integrated into the financial intermediary 
sector.   
 
Just as with the US subprime crisis, the structural change coincided with financial 
innovation, especially with the development of the securities market.  Whereas the US 
subprime crisis was primarily one about debt financing through securities, the 1980s 






















The sums raised by Japanese firms in the capital markets rose very substantially in the 
late 1980s.  For instance, in 1984, newly issued securities by all listed Japanese firms was 
around 5.4 trillion yen.  That figure had gone up to 28.4 trillion yen in 1989.  In this 
increase of securities funding for the Japanese financial system, foreign investors played 
a key role.  For instance, the proportion of bonds issued outside Japan was 60% of the 
total in 1989.  The parallel with the US mortgage boom is striking (Table 1). 
 
                                                 
6  It is also notable in the late 1980s that individuals’ preference for time deposits at banks over postal 
savings was strong and it led to increases in deposits held by individuals at banks.  This can be captured as 
a factor increasing zi in the equation.  The related figures are shown in a later section.   11
Debt financing through bond offerings was not the only source of capital market 
financing available to Japanese firms.  Listed firms were able to issue new stock and 
raised substantial funding through the capital markets.  In 1986 the total stock financing 
of listed firms in Japan stood at 0.87 trillion yen.  By contrast, in 1989, the total stock 










1972 1,784,689 58.4 41.6 0.0 0.0
1973 2,240,766 41.9 58.1 0.1 0.2
1974 1,741,396 31.2 68.8 3.4 4.9
1975 3,187,449 31.4 68.6 11.7 17.0
1976 2,302,001 29.9 70.1 18.1 25.8
1977 2,543,740 36.3 63.7 14.7 23.1
1978 2,972,270 30.2 69.8 16.4 23.5
1979 3,298,028 28.9 71.1 24.0 33.8
1980 2,883,285 36.5 63.5 24.1 37.9
1981 4,400,028 43.8 56.2 19.8 35.2
1982 4,084,502 33.0 67.0 27.7 41.3
1983 4,048,420 19.8 80.2 44.8 55.9
1984 5,409,408 19.3 80.7 44.0 54.5
1985 6,890,503 12.5 87.5 51.0 58.2
1986 8,395,196 10.4 89.6 48.2 53.8
1987 14,455,291 20.8 79.2 39.9 46.6
1988 17,636,098 27.1 72.9 30.5 41.9
1989 28,410,407 31.1 68.9 41.4 60.0
1990 14,441,448 26.3 73.7 35.8 48.5
1991 12,500,454 6.5 93.5 63.5 67.9
1992 9,619,910 4.4 95.6 60.2 62.9
1993 11,143,567 7.4 92.6 45.0 48.6
1994 8,499,604 11.0 89.0 22.6 25.4
1995 8,094,650 7.9 92.1 23.2 25.1
1996 13,616,878 15.2 84.8 18.3 21.6
1997 10,162,545 11.4 88.6 23.4 26.4
1998 15,906,750 9.7 90.3 10.0 11.1
















1972 1,041,409 63.9 0.0 36.1
1973 939,266 60.2 0.0 39.8
1974 544,007 51.0 0.0 49.0
1975 1,001,104 22.1 0.0 77.9
1976 688,723 70.9 0.0 29.1
1977 922,601 65.4 0.0 34.6
1978 896,653 63.1 0.0 36.9
1979 953,439 65.9 0.0 34.1
1980 1,052,076 83.7 0.0 16.3
1981 1,926,415 72.5 0.0 27.5
1982 1,349,335 79.5 0.2 20.3
1983 801,757 58.8 3.8 37.4
1984 1,043,132 78.1 6.3 15.6
1985 859,113 58.9 16.0 25.2
1986 872,514 45.8 42.7 11.4
1987 3,013,048 46.3 35.6 18.1
1988 4,782,307 54.0 27.4 18.6
1989 8,848,608 65.9 24.7 9.4
1990 3,792,439 52.1 17.9 30.0
1991 807,733 15.6 44.6 39.8
1992 419,907 1.0 48.4 50.7
1993 822,790 0.9 75.0 24.1
1994 935,740 14.6 48.2 37.2
1995 638,413 5.2 46.9 47.9
1996 2,073,967 14.7 32.5 52.8
1997 1,162,369 11.0 31.7 57.3
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4.  Financial Intermediation by Non-Financial Companies 
 
As a result of the increased access of non-financial companies to the capital markets, the 
nature of the balance sheets of these companies began to undergo fundamental changes.   
 
First, in aggregate terms, the role of private non-financial companies in their relationship 
with the rest of the economy changed from being net debtors to net creditors.  The change 




























Difference between financial assets and
liabilities: A-B




Note: End of fiscal year.  Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
We can see from this figure that the financial assets of Japanese non-financial firms 
increased rapidly in the late 1980s.  In 1986, financial assets exceeded financial liabilities 
for the first time, and this difference continued to increase.  The peak came in 1988, when 
the excess financial assets of non-financial firms reached 29 % of nominal GDP. 
 
The nature of the financial assets is crucial for the rest of our argument, as we will show 
now that the non-financial firms were raising capital market funds, and then channeling 
such funding into the banking system. 
 
One indicator is the liquidity ratios for non-financial firms, as measured by the sum of 
“cash and deposits” and “securities in liquid assets (hereafter, “securities”)”.  We first 
examine the “liquidity ratio”, which is defined as follows: 
 
Liquidity Ratio = (cash and deposits + securities assets) / sales 
 
In this ratio, “sales” are used as the standardizing variable so that we gain an indication of 
the holding of cash and deposits as a transactions buffer in the course of everyday 
business.  A high liquidity ratio indicates aggressive financial investments by that firm. 
 
The figure for all industries by size shows the liquidity ratio was high for all size groups 
in the bubble period, but was especially pronounced for large enterprises (Figure 4).   
These were the companies that had the best access to the capital markets, and so it 


















Source: Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Looking at the manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises separately, we have the 
following observations (Figures 5 and 6): 
 
•  Non-manufacturing enterprises of all sizes increased their liquidity ratio. 
•  Large enterprises had larger increases in the liquidity ratio in the bubble period. 
•  Large manufacturing enterprises had achieved the highest liquidity ratio. 
•  Medium-sized and small manufacturing enterprises did not have large increases in 













Source: Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Ministry of Finance. 
Figure 4. Liquidity Ratio of All Industries by Size 












Source:  Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
In effect, a high liquidity ratio is indicative of a type of “carry trade” conducted by the 
non-financial firms.  The transaction is a purely financial one in which funds are raised in 
the capital markets by issuing securities, and then deposited in the banking sector in the 
form of deposits.   
 
The purely financial aspect of the transaction can be verified also by looking at changes 
in correlation between liquidity held by non-financial firms and the timing of their 
business fixed investments (Figure 7).  In the 1970s, there was a negative correlation 
between the liquidity ratio and the lagging growth rate of business fixed investments by 
non-financial firms.  It means that liquidity holdings decreased when they were used for 
the disbursements for business fixed investments.  But, in the 1980s, the negative 
correlation started becoming much weaker.  Eventually, it virtually vanished with a large 
increase in the liquidity ratio in the second half of the decade. 


















Business fixed investmet growth rate (rhs)
 
Note: Large enterprise. Four-quarter backward moving average. The 4th lag for business fixed investment 
annual real growth rate. Quarterly data.  Source: Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry, Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
The reason for the collapse of the negative correlation between the liquidity ratio and 
business fixed investments can be attributed to the introduction of time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates.  Before the financial product was available, Japanese firms 
could not hold the funds in their deposit accounts yielding competitive market interest 
rates.  Therefore, the opportunity cost of holding unused liquidity was so high that the 
firms needed to carefully schedule the timing of fund raising and the disbursements for 
business fixed investments to avoid timing mismatches.  The introduction of time 
deposits with liberalized interest rates enabled the firms to raise funds by tapping capital 
markets without paying much attention to the timing of the disbursements.  The reason 
was twofold.  First, as already noted, interest rates of time deposits with liberalized 
interest rates were as high as competitive market interest rates and the opportunity cost of 
holding unused liquidity effectively vanished.  Second, the term of time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates could be chosen flexibly by depositors, provided that it was 
longer than the minimum term set by the regulation.  The regulated minimum term was 
gradually shortened, contracting from three months to one month in late 1987.  The 
flexibility in the term of time deposits and their competitive interest rates enabled non-
financial firms to raise funds in the capital markets and keep them in the form of time 
deposits without opportunity cost for potential disbursements for business fixed 
investment in the future.
 7 
 
We next examine a more detailed picture of the composition of the corporate balance 
sheets in an aggregate form from the Flow of Funds Accounts. 
 
                                                 
7  A more detailed discussion is provided in Bank of Japan (1991a). 
Figure 7. Liquidity Ratio and Business Fixed Investment Annual Growth Rate   17
We begin with the liabilities side of the corporate balance sheet, and in particular the 
flows of new liabilities (Figure 8).  A notable difference between the period before 1987 
and the bubble period (say, 1987 to 1989 or 1990) is the funding raised by “shares and 
other equities” and “securities other than shares”.  Also notable is the large item 
classified as “loans”.   
 
Since we are examining the aggregate corporate series, we have put together companies 
that tap the securities markets with those that rely on bank financing.  What is notable is 
how both market-based and bank-based funding increased during the bubble period in the 


























 Trade credits and foreign trade credits
 Securities other than shares




Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
Still on the liabilities side of the corporate balance sheet, a more detailed breakdown of 
the “securities” category can be seen in Figure 9, below.   
 
Securities here mean “shares and other equities” and “securities other than shares” that 
are a component in Figure 8.  Some features are noticeable.  First, it is notable how the 
funds raised through the securities market increased in the late 1980s.  This confirms our 
discussion earlier on the increased importance of capital market funding for Japanese 
companies in the late 1980s. 
 
Note also the emergence of CP as a funding source for companies.  CP was permitted in 
November of 1987, and saw a rapid adoption by the corporate sector.   
 
One feature that distinguishes the 1980s bubble in Japan from the US mortgage boom is 
the increased use of equity financing.  We can see that the funding raised from “shares 
and other equities” was very substantial in the bubble period.  
Figure 8. Fundraising by Private Non-Financial Corporations 



























Other "securities other than shares"
 Commercial paper
 External securities issued by residents
 Industrial securities
 Shares and other equities
 Total
 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
We now turn to the asset side of the balance sheet, and examine how the firms used the 
funding that they raised in the capital markets.  The most notable feature is the “carry 
trade” mentioned above, in which funds raised in the capital markets were reinvested in 
the banking system through deposits.  Note in Figure 10 that the inflows into deposits in 
1987 to 1989 were very high.   
 
The deregulation of bank deposit interest rates can be expected to have played a key role 
in this development of the “carry trade”.   In 1985, time deposits with liberalized interest 
rates were introduced.  The increase in deposits picked up more noticeably later in the 
decade.  The role of market interest rates and the stance of monetary policy are crucial in 






Figure 9. Fundraising by Private Non-Financial Corporations 

























 Trade credits and foreign trade credits
 Securities other than shares
 Shares and other equities
 Currency and deposits
 Total
 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
A more detailed breakdown of the currency and deposits category can be seen in Figure 
11.  We see that the biggest increases in the deposits took the form of time deposits that 
earned the highest interest rates.  During the midst of the bubble period, almost all of the 
increase in bank deposits took the form of time deposits.  In 1990, once the bubble had 
burst, time deposits were drawn down substantially by firms that withdrew cash for their 



























 Others including demand
deposits
 Certificates of deposits
 Time and savings
deposits
 Currency and deposits
 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Bank of Japan. 
 
Figure 10. Financial Investments by Private Non-Financial Corporations 
(Total) 
Figure 11. Financial Investments by Private Non-Financial Corporations 
 (Currency and Deposits)   20
It should also be remembered that during the bubble period, household savers also 
preferred time deposits at banks to postal savings.  This was due to the higher interest rate 
paid to time deposits at banks that were based on market interest rates, as opposed to 
regulated postal saving rates.  In 1980-84, 41% of the increase of individuals’ time and 
saving deposits including postal savings went to postal savings.  In 1985-89, that share 
was down to 35.7%.  In 1990-94, it rose again, to 45.6%. 
 
Figure 12 below shows that time deposits at city banks as a share of total deposits 














Market interest rate-based time deposits as a share of total time deposits at city banks 
increased dramatically in the late 1980s.  It was 8.4% in 1985, rising to 88.0% in 1990.  
Over the same period, the share of market interest rate-based time deposits as a 
proportion of total deposits at city banks increased from 5.2% to 61.6%. 
 
The effect of the increase in the share of market interest rate-based time deposits was 
twofold.  First, it raised the cost of deposit funding for banks in comparison with 
regulated deposit interest rates.  Second, it gave banks the flexibility to raise deposits 
without increasing the number of branch offices  and resorting to non-price, labor-
intensive competition measures at branch offices, such as frequent visits to customers.  It 
is plausible that it became easier for city banks especially to increase deposits via their 
wholesale business because large-sized time deposits with liberalized interest rates were 
typically from companies.  They could get such deposits at the wholesale sections of the 
main office and existing branch offices. 
  
Concurrent with the increased proportion of time deposits in the deposit base for the 
banking sector, there was also a shortening of maturities, reflecting the greater short-term 
Figure 12. Share of Time Deposits in Total Outstanding Deposits 
Note: City banks. Excluding offshore accounts.  Source: Economic Statistics Annual, 
Bank of Japan.   21
nature of the deposits held by the companies.  The “carry trade” interpretation of the 
deposit claims appears consistent with this evidence.  Figure 13 below shows the average 
maturity of the deposits at all banks.  There is a conspicuous shortening of maturities 
during the bubble period.  By accepting time deposits with shorter terms, banks could 
lower the cost of deposits.  As we have already seen, the minimum term of market 
interest rate-based time deposits was gradually shortened and this deregulation enabled 
















Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
A more detailed picture of the maturity structure of time deposits can be seen in Table 3.   
 




1 month or more
but less than
3 months
3 months or more
but less than
6 months
6 months or more
but less than 1
year
1 year or more Sub-total
1985 4.2 6.5 88.0 98.7 1.3 100.0
1986 8.6 6.0 84.3 98.9 1.1 100.0
1987 19.8 6.9 72.4 99.1 0.9 100.0
1988 16.3 18.8 7.0 57.2 99.3 0.7 100.0
1989 24.5 24.8 6.7 43.4 99.4 0.6 100.0
1990 38.9 28.3 8.2 24.2 99.6 0.4 100.0
1991 38.2 30.5 9.8 21.1 99.6 0.4 100.0
1992 41.0 26.1 8.2 24.1 99.5 0.5 100.0
1993 39.0 23.4 7.4 29.8 99.6 0.4 100.0
1994 42.0 21.2 9.6 26.9 99.6 0.4 100.0
1995 37.2 23.7 11.0 27.8 99.7 0.3 100.0
Individuals
1 month or more
but less than
3 months
3 months or more
but less than
6 months
6 months or more
but less than 1
year
1 year or more Sub-total
1985 2.4 3.0 44.7 50.2 49.8 100.0
1986 1.9 2.6 42.5 47.1 52.9 100.0
1987 2.3 2.8 41.9 47.0 53.0 100.0
1988 1.4 2.6 2.8 41.8 48.6 51.4 100.0
1989 4.4 4.2 3.4 37.2 49.2 50.8 100.0
1990 11.5 13.0 8.2 35.3 68.1 31.9 100.0
1991 11.1 16.8 13.5 41.9 83.3 16.7 100.0
1992 12.1 13.3 8.1 42.1 75.7 24.3 100.0
1993 7.9 8.9 6.8 49.5 73.2 26.8 100.0
1994 9.2 8.4 8.3 48.0 73.9 26.0 100.0











Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
A more direct indication of the “carry trade” nature of financial intermediation of the 
non-financial corporate sector can be seen from the annual changes in liquidity (cash and 
deposits, securities in liquid asset on the balance sheet) versus the amount of bank 
borrowings.  
 
Large enterprises as a group expanded their balance sheets by increasing their financial 
integration with the banking sector, in the following sense.  When the sector balance 
sheet is taken as whole, the asset side of the aggregate balance sheet grew through 
increases in holdings of cash, bank deposits, and liquid securities, while the liabilities 
side increased through greater bank borrowing.  Thus, the large enterprise sector as a 
whole both borrowed and lent more to the banking sector.  Figure 14 below should be 
read as follows:  Liabilities enter with a negative sign.  Therefore, bank loan (borrowing) 
are shown as negative bars.  We see that both assets and liabilities increased 
simultaneously, whereby firms (collectively) increased their claims on banks through 
deposits, and then received loans from the banks through increased loans. 
 
The plausible interpretation is that the banking system was used as the conduit between 
different classes of firms, where some firms acted as net lenders while others acted as net 
borrowers.  In aggregate, the firms increased both their borrowing as well as their lending 
Table 3. Breakdown of Time Deposits by Term   23
vis-à-vis the banks.  These “double-sided transactions” were a well-known phenomenon 



































As for medium-sized enterprises, the double-sided transactions were observed in 1986 
but were not obvious in other years.  Indeed, for these firms, their relationship with the 
banking system took on the more standard appearance of a debtor relative to the banking 
system.  Medium-sized firms were primarily borrowers from the banks, rather than 
lenders to the banks.  The difference between large and medium-sized firms can be 
attributed to the fact that only large firms had easy access to the capital markets in raising 
funds.  Medium-sized firms had to rely on the traditional bank-based financing (Figure 
15). 
 
Figure 14. Assets and Liabilities 



































We can also detect a difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.  
The large manufacturing enterprises actually were paying back their bank borrowing. 
This is shown as the positive value in Figure 16 below (remember, the bank loan figure is 
converted as a negative value.)  At the same time, they increased liquid assets on their 
balance sheets.  Those observations are consistent with the fact that large manufacturing 
enterprises had achieved the highest liquidity ratio in the bubble period, and were 
engaged in the “carry trade” of borrowing from the capital markets in order to lend to the 
banks through deposits. 
 
Figure 15. Assets and Liabilities 































As for medium-sized enterprises, they performed the double-sided transactions in 85, 86, 



























Note: Changes from the previous year.  Source: Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Ministry 
of Finance. 
 
Figure 16. Assets and Liabilities 
(Large Enterprises, Manufacturing Firms) 
Figure 17. Assets and Liabilities 
(Medium-Sized Enterprises, Manufacturing Firms)   26
Non-manufacturing enterprises behaved in a different way (Figure 18). Large non-
manufacturing firms borrowed a lot as well as increased their liquid assets. The double-
sided transactions were distinguished at large non-manufacturing enterprises. Note that 
the scale of the vertical axis is bigger in the chart for large non-manufacturing enterprises 

































The medium-sized enterprises increased borrowings (Figure 19). In some years in the 
bubble period, they performed the double-sided transactions but by and large they 

















Figure 18. Assets and Liabilities 































5.  Shifts in the Composition of Bank Lending 
 
The developments highlighted so far had an impact on the banking sector in several ways.  
An inevitable consequence of the increased financial intermediation role played by non-
financial companies was that the banks were pressured on both sides of their balance 
sheets.    
 
On the asset side, the banks lost many of their traditional borrowing customers.  In 
particular, large non-financial companies that previously relied on the banking systems to 
supply credit could turn to the capital markets to raise funds. 
 
The increased role of capital market funding by non-financial companies also had 
repercussions for the banking sector through the liabilities side.  The “carry trade” 
engaged by the non-financial companies resulted in the increased funds available for use 
by the banks through the increased time deposits with liberalized interest rates. 
 
Banks faced higher costs of funding through market interest rate-based deposits.  In 
comparison with the regulated deposit rates, market interest rate-based deposit rates 
resulted in higher rates. The share of funds raised without regulation in the total funds at 
city banks rose from about 17% in 1980 to about 70% in 1990 (Bank of Japan (1991b)).  
According to an estimate in the Bank of Japan report (Bank of Japan (1991c)), this 
change in the composition of deposits meant that the average deposit rate was 150 bps 
higher in 1990 than it would have been assuming that all deposits were raised under 
regulated interest rates in the same year. 
 
Figure 19. Assets and Liabilities 
(Medium-Sized Enterprises, Non-Manufacturing Firms)   28
These changes meant a less favorable earnings environment for banks than before.   
Indeed, the short-term deposit and lending rate spread shrunk from about 300 bps in the 
first half of the 1980s to about 160 bps later in the decade.  Nonetheless, the profit of the 
Japanese banking sector in the second half of the 1980s broke historical records.  The 
reasons for this are instructive.  Pressured on both sides of their balance sheets, the banks 
had to search for new borrowers, both in order to replace their traditional borrowing 
customers, but also to utilize the new funding resources supplied to them by corporate 
depositors.  The natural response of the banks was to lower their lending standards so that 
they would attract more business (Bank of Japan (1991c)). 
 
The response by the banks was reflected on the asset side of their balance sheets in terms 
of the changed composition of loans.  The banks increasingly resorted to riskier loans 
along three dimensions:   
 
•  First, they began to lend more to smaller firms that were previously shut out of the 
credit market.   
•  Second, they resorted to longer-term loans.   
•  Third, they increased loans to real estate-related sectors.   
 
We consider these three issues in turn. 
 
The size profile of corporate borrowers from the banks can be seen in Figure 20.  At the 
end of 1975, large enterprises accounted for more than 40% of total loans to domestic 
corporations, but this figure decreased to about 20% at the end of 1990.  Conversely, the 
share of loans to small enterprises increased from about 35% to about 65% over the same 
period.  At the same time, loans to individuals as a share of total outstanding loans also 





































Note: Total outstanding loans used for calculations are outstanding loans and discounts to domestic 
corporate borrowers excluding overdrafts. Large enterprises are corporations with capital of 1 billion 
yen or more and more than 300 regular employees. For the wholesale trade industry, the criterion for 
the number of regular employees is more than 100 persons. For the retail and service industries, it is 
more than 50 persons. Small enterprises are unincorporated enterprises as well as corporations with 
capital of 100 million yen or less or with regular employees of 300 persons or fewer. For the 
wholesale trade industry, the definition is corporations capitalized at 30 million yen or less or with 
100 regular employees or fewer. For the retail trade and service industries, it is corporations 
capitalized at 10 million yen or less or with 50 regular employees or fewer. Outstanding loans for 
medium-sized enterprises are calculated by excluding those for small enterprises and large 
enterprises from total outstanding loans.   Source: Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
The increased maturity of loans can be seen in the following figure (Figure 21), which 
plots the proportion of loans with maturities longer than one year.  We can see that the 













Note: Long-term loans are loans with maturity longer than 1 year.  Source: Economic 
Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 
Figure 20. Breakdowns of Corporate Borrowers by Size 
Figure 21. Ratio of Long-term Loans in Total Outstanding Loans   30
An increased weighting was placed on lending to real estate-related sectors (construction, 
real estate, non-bank financial), as shown in Figure 22.  The non-bank financial 
intermediaries engaged mainly in lending to the real estate industry, and so was a prime 
channel through which increased credit fuelled the property bubble.  In this way, the 



















Total of real estate-related
sectors
 
Note: Real estate-related sectors include real estate, construction, and non-bank financial. 
Total outstanding loans used for calculations are outstanding loans and discounts to 
domestic corporate borrowers excluding overdrafts. Outstanding loans to the non-bank 
financial industry are the sum of those to the other financial industry and the lease 
industry.  Source: Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
Nevertheless, bank profitability remained high, due to the benign macroeconomic 
conditions and the economic boom that was an integral part of the lending boom that 
resulted.  The parallels with the US mortgage boom in the early years of this decade are 
striking.   Measured loan quality remained very high during the bubble era, as seen in 
Figure 23 below that shows the quarterly series of ratios of the total debts of defaulted 
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Note: The ratio of total debt of defaulted firms to total outstanding loans of all banks. Quarterly 
data.  Source:  Tokyo Shoko Research,  Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
According to these statistics, the default rate of loans was lower in the bubble period than 
it was in other periods. The default rate also continued to fall from 1987 to the end of 
1990. 
 
Bank profitability remained high during this period, resulting in a strong accumulation of 
surpluses at the banks.  In accordance with this, the capital position of the banks in the 
late 1980s period strengthened dramatically.  The following figure (Figure 24) shows the 






























Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 
Figure 23. Default Rate 
Figure 24. Compositions of Bank Capital   32
The increased profitability of the banks bolstered their common stock.  The banking 
sector itself was able to raise new equity financing on the back of the buoyant stock 
market.  Just as non-financial firms were able to raise more equity funding, so were the 
banks able to tap the same market.  An increased flow of equity funding by issuing new 
stocks was seen.  Part of the increased capital raising was associated with the impending 
BIS capital regulation.  Figure 25 shows the evolution of common stock plus capital 
reserves.  The capital raised by issuing new stocks is eventually booked either as 































A consequence of the strong capital position was the low leverage ratio of the banks.  
This is another important instance in which the 1980s bubble period in Japan differs from 
the US mortgage boom of the early years of this decade.  Whereas the market-based 
financial intermediaries based in the United States increased their leverage sharply in the 
years immediately prior to the current financial crisis, this was not the case for banks in 
Japan in the 1980s bubble.   
 
The following (Figure 26) is the time series of leverage for Japanese banks from 1980 to 
1995, where leverage is defined as the ratio of “assets” (or “loans and discounts”) on 
aggregated city bank balance sheet to the sum of “common stock” and “capital reserves” 
on the balance sheet.  As we can see, the leverages went down during the bubble era.  
This is one respect in which the outward appearance of the 1980s bubble in Japan 
differed from the recent boom and bust cycle among US financial intermediaries – 
especially the market-based intermediaries such as the investment banks. 
 
                                                 
8  After the bubble era, it was stable until the government injected public money into the capital of ailing 
banks. 
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 

















Assets/(Common stock + Capital
reserves)
(Loans and discounts)/(Common
stock + Capital reserves)
 
Note: City banks.  Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Bank of Japan. 
 
 
The fact that leverage went down is an indication of the rapid pace of new equity 
issuance, as we have discussed already.  Some of the new stock issues had a regulatory 
dimension, associated with the impending adoption of the Basel capital accord of 1988.  
Banks had a heightened sense of concern about the BIS capital regulation and possible 
change of official attitude toward the banking sector.  The concern was the weakening of 
the implicit guarantee in place before the financial liberalization of the 1980s.  Ironically, 
however, the buoyant nature of the stock market in Japan during the bubble era created a 
favorable environment in which the banks could ease the severity of the capital constraint 
on their lending activities.  Instead, the banks continued to extend riskier loans to SMEs 
based on lower collateral standards, as well as to the non-bank financial intermediaries 




6.  Short-Term Interest Rate Spreads 
 
To this point, we have not explained why non-financial firms had the incentive to engage 
in their “carry trade” by borrowing in the capital markets and then lending to the banks 
via time deposits with liberalized interest rates.  However, as with any “carry trade”, the 
interest rate differential is all important in determining the profitability of the trade, and 
hence the incentive to engage in such trades. 
 
The final piece in the jigsaw puzzle that will complete our argument is thus to show that 
the short-term interest rate spreads were such that the carry trade was profitable.  The 
particular interest rate spread of interest to us is the difference between the market 
Figure 26. Leverage   34
interest rate in the capital markets at which non-financial firms could borrow, and the 
bank deposit interest rate at which the non-financial firms could lend.  For the carry trade 
to be profitable, the deposit rate should be higher than the capital market rate. 
 
Unfortunately, appropriate data on capital market interest rates for short-term instruments 
such as CP in the bubble period are not available now.  But, there are some reports 
pointing to the profitability of the arbitrage between such instruments and bank deposits 
in the period.  The Bank of Japan (1989) refers to the fact that large non-financial firms 
could gain interest rate margins by issuing CP and depositing the raised funds at banks as 
time deposits with liberalized interest rates.  It concludes that this arbitrage opportunity 
worked toward the rapid expansion of the CP markets in the bubble period to a great 
degree.  De Brouwer (1996) similarly notes that a positive spread between the interest 
rate on certificates of deposit (CD) and CP gave firms an incentive to borrow at the low 
CP rate and deposit the proceeds in CDs at a higher rate.   
 
We can show a more striking fact illustrating how anomalous the bubble period was.  The 
figure below (Figure 27) shows time deposit interest rates (regulated and unregulated) 
and prime lending rates (short-term and long-term).  From 1985 when time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates were introduced to the middle of 1990, the 3-6 month time 
deposit rate (unregulated, new receipts) was consistently higher than the short-term (less 
than 1 year) prime rate for the highest credit quality borrowers.   
 
Indeed, for some of the time, the time deposit rate was even higher than the long-term 
prime lending rate.  This happened just after the introduction of the deposit product and 
just before 1990 – the peak of the bubble.  So it was possible for high credit quality 
borrowers (presumably large firms and borrowers with good collateral), to profit by 
borrowing funds at the short-term prime lending rate from banks and depositing the 
borrowed funds at banks as time deposits with liberalized interest rates.  This arbitrage 
opportunity remains even after the introduction of the new short-term prime lending rate 
in January 1989 that was determined by reference to actual funding costs for banks rather 





























A very natural question is why the banks themselves did not raise short-term funding 
from the capital markets directly – for instance, by issuing market-based bills or CP.
9  An 
answer here is that the banks were not permitted to issue CP or other such bills due to 
regulatory hurdles until much later.
10  Thus, the interest rate spread that gave rise to the 
“carry trade” was itself part of the regulatory landscape.  Another reason is that banks 
offered favorable terms on time deposits for large non-financial firms, aiming to expand 
the potential customer base in businesses that they would enter in the future.  We believe 
this business expansion motive is the most plausible explanation for the anomalous 







                                                 
9  The three long-term credit banks issued medium term bank debentures. 
10  While non-financial corporations were permitted to issue commercial paper in 1987, banks were not 
permitted to do so until 1998. 
Figure 27. Time Deposit Rates and Prime Lending Rates 
Note: The “3-6 month time deposit rate (unregulated, new receipts)” is the average interest rate on newly received time deposits 
with unregulated interest rates of terms between 3 and 6 months. “3 month time deposit rate (regulated, new receipts)” is the 
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7.  Macroeconomic Background 
 
The financial system perspective adopted in this paper provides a useful approach to 
understanding the process of aggregate credit expansion.  The perspective allows us to 
pin down the relationship between funds from non-leveraged institutions in the inter-
locking system of balance sheets with leveraged financial institutions, the equity of 
leveraged financial institutions, the leverage of leveraged financial institutions in the 
financial system, and the total credit produced in the financial system.  We have so far 
discussed the case of the United States and Japan in light of the financial system 
perspective and illuminated the mechanisms behind the observed phenomena. 
 
However, the financial system perspective is incomplete without an explanation of what 
motivated the leveraged institutions in the system to expand their capacity and thereby 
lend so aggressively.  It is here that we believe that the macroeconomic backdrop in terms 
of monetary conditions and the reform of the regulatory landscape play key roles.   
 
Financial Liberalization 
As already discussed, the funds raised by large non-financial firms flowed into the 
banking sector and this led to the expansion of credit provided by the banks in the late 
1980s in Japan.  Although monetary policy easing and the increase in asset prices 
contributed to the credit expansion, it is difficult to explain the credit expansion in the 
bubble period without the role played by deregulation in the capital markets that relaxed 
existing restrictions on bond issues and by the introduction of time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates.    
 
The key feature of financial liberalization in Japan was its gradual implementation.  The 
liberalization process was initiated in the late 1970s and was not completed until the so-
called Financial Big Bang in 1998.  The whole process thus took a full twenty years. 
 
There were three main strands to the financial liberalization, namely (1) the deregulation 
of deposit and lending interest rates, (2) relaxation of the separation of business between 
banking and securities firms, and (3) the integration of domestic financial markets into 
the global capital markets.  In the late 1980s, the deregulation of deposit interest rates 
was in its final stages.  As for the deregulation of the separation of business between 
banks and securities firms, the process got underway in the 1980s: securities firms started 
sales of medium-term government bond funds in 1980 that was an equivalence of NOW 
account in the United States, and banks started sales of public sector bonds to customers.  
With expectations of further deregulation to come, banks had a strong incentive to 
augment the foundations of the securities business they would launch in the future.
11  The 
internationalization of financial markets also made significant progress.  For example, the 
real demand requirements for forward exchange transactions and the restrictions on 
                                                 
11  The discussion on the deregulation of the separation of business between banks and securities firms 
began in the 1980s and was once materialized as the Financial System Reform Law legislated in June 1992, 
which allowed banks and securities firms to enter each others’ business via subsidiaries.  It took six more 
years to complete the whole process as the “Financial Big Bang” in 1998.   37
banks’ net short spot positions in foreign currencies were both eliminated, in April and 
June 1984, respectively. 
 
Rather than focusing on innovations to their business model that kept pace with the 
changes in financial landscape, banks focused instead on profit maximization via 
expansion of the balance sheets.
12  The behavior of Japanese banks was not only the 
result of inertia in their business model under the regime of regulated interest rates. 
 
Banks were highly motivated to expand the potential business base of securities business, 
as well as fee businesses such as the cash management service, in advance of their entry 
into the securities business after further deregulation of the separation of business 
between banks and securities firms.  Taking their entry into the potentially profitable 
business into account, the banks were trying to keep or strengthen the business 
relationship with large non-financial firms by providing financial products with 
competitive market interest rates vis-à-vis capital market products, namely time deposits 
with liberalized interest rates.  As we have already seen, these liabilities were deployed 
on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheets and this resulted in expansion of their 
balance sheet size.  
 
Another phenomenon observed in the late 1980s was the reduced stringency of some 
policy measures implemented in the regime with regulated interest rates.  Under the 
regime, increases in deposits and loans outstanding almost directly led to increases in 
bank profits.  This feature stemming from the regulatory framework motivated banks to 
expand their balance sheets as much as possible and this motivation would have resulted 
in excessive lending.  One policy measure for decelerating volume expansion was the 
regulation on the establishment of new branch offices by the Ministry of Finance that 
effectively put a curb on the availability of deposits for banks.  In the process of financial 
liberalization, banks found new ways to raise funds, such as time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates, and the effectiveness of the regulation on new branch office 
establishment decreased.  Moreover, as part of financial liberalization, the regulation was 
operated in a more flexible or less stringent way than before. 
 
With respect to the asset side of the balance sheet of banks, the window guidance by the 
Bank of Japan had the role of decelerating balance sheet expansion by banks.  The 
window guidance “had the function to complement interest rate policy for monetary 
policy implementation” (Suzuki (1984)).  However, in the process of financial 
liberalization, the Bank of Japan started respecting more autonomy for banks to choose 
the level of loans outstanding and the window guidance was eventually abolished in 1991.  
Hoshi et al. (1993) pointed out that the window guidance did not work as a measure to 
curb loans outstanding in the late 1980s.   
                                                 
12  A report publishes by the Bank of Japan summarizes its assessment of risk management by banks in the 
late 1980s as “There were many cases in which the evaluation of collateral such as real estate was not strict 
enough in an environment of rising land and stock prices.  Moreover, identification of the purpose of the 
funds and evaluation of the borrowers’ ability to repay, etc, were not appropriate in many loan contracts.  
On the whole, it is hard to deny that some slackness in each step of the loan practice, i.e., prior examination, 
interim-monitoring and loan asset protection, was observed.” (Bank of Japan (1991)).   38
 
Actually, the role of the window guidance was wider than mere lending volume controls, 
and it worked as a means of communication on macro credit demand between the Bank 
of Japan and private banks.  Although the window guidance has often been criticized as a 
discretionary policy measure against market principles, the measure could have been used 
to send an effective warning (“moral suasion”) to the banking sector directly about its 
excessive behavior.  In other words, the policy measure could have been used for macro 
prudential policy communication. 
 
Expectation of Continuation of Monetary Policy Easing due to the Government Policy 
Commitment 
It has been noted that monetary policy was accommodative for longer than was necessary 
and that this was a fundamental factor in the appreciation of asset prices and the 
expansion of credit in the late 1980s.  However, a noteworthy fact concerning monetary 
policy in this period was the emergence of expectations of continued monetary policy 
easing.  The background to this was the government’s commitments in the international 
policy coordination pledged in the period.
13, 14 
 
One of the primary policy issues in the late 1980s was the increasing current account 
surplus, especially with respect to the United States.  The current account was almost in 
balance at the beginning of the 1980s, but it had moved into a substantial surplus of 3.7% 
of GDP in 1985.  The government policy stance to curb the increase in the current 
account surplus was to introduce policy measures designed to bolster imports through an 
expansion of domestic demand, rather than by restricting exports.  This policy stance 
would have been interpreted as a commitment to a continuation of monetary policy 
easing as a measure to expand the domestic demand as long as a significant current 
account surplus existed.
15 
                                                 
13  Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) points to the expectations of continued monetary policy easing 
by referring to the yield curve flattening in the late 1980s in Japan.  
14   It has been noted that the so-called Mayekawa Report (Report of Studies Group on the Structural 
Adjustment for International Coordination) published by the government in April 1986 was a symbolic 
manifestation of the government’s commitment to the international policy coordination in this period.     
Moreover, the Mayekawa Report has often been referred to as the government’s firm commitment to 
keeping eased monetary policy as a means of expanding domestic demand.  This understanding of the 
report is not correct.  In fact, the main message in the report was the need to reform the structure of the 
economy with low income elasticity of imports and high income elasticity of exports, so as to reduce the 
current account surplus.  The proposed policy direction in the report was increasing imports through 
deregulation and improved access to the domestic markets, rather than by restricting exports with 
protectionist measures such as quantity controls.  The emphasis in the report on the importance of domestic 
demand-led growth was a reflection of the policy consensus in Japan and the report carefully pointed to the 
importance of eliminating obstacles for increasing domestic demand in various aspects.  For example, it 
warned that a rapid appreciation of housing prices would hinder housing purchases and that warning proved 
to be correct. 
15   In the formation of expectations of a continuing real estate price boom, the “public information” 
disseminated by the government would have contributed to a great degree although we can not call it a 
“commitment” pledged by the government.  Yoshikawa (2002) claims that the estimates on the scarcity of 
office space in Tokyo reported in the “Metropolitan Reconstruction Plan” (1985) and “The 4th National 
Comprehensive Development Plan” (1987) by the National Land Agency worked to form bullish 
expectations held by banks on future demand for real estates, and large increases in bank lending to real   39
 
After the Plaza Accord in September of 1985, the Japanese yen appreciated considerably.  
As a result, the current account surplus in terms of quantity started decreasing although 
the decrease was not large.  In contrast, it took more time for the current account surplus 
in nominal terms to begin decreasing, because of the so-called J-curve effect.  Actually, it 
reached 4.2% of GDP in 1986 and it was still 2.1% of GDP in 1989.  On top of the slow 
pace of reduction of the current account surplus, the monetary policy easing in some 
developed countries following the plunge of stock prices in October of 1987 (“Black 





8.  Lessons for Monetary Policy 
 
Need for a More Comprehensive Assessment of Financial Institutions 
In liberalized modern financial markets, the intermediation of funds is through numerous 
channels.  The inflow of international funds into the financial sector via mortgage-backed 
securities in the US case shares similarities with the Japanese experience in the 1980s 
bubble, which saw inflow of funds raised in the capital markets by large non-financial 
firms into time deposits with liberalized interest rates at banks.  In both cases, the 
structure of the financial system was undergoing rapid change.  In these circumstances, 
previously reliable indicators of the soundness of financial institutions such as capital 
asset ratios and liquidity ratios may not remain effective indicators that ring alarm bells.  
In the US case, although the liquidity ratio was deteriorating, the capital asset ratio was 
thought to be satisfactory.  In the Japanese case, neither ratio warned of any serious 
future problems in the midst of the bubble.  Those experiences suggest that policy 
authorities should be wary of the complacent belief that existing indicators of financial 
conditions are still always reliable.  In particular, new approaches to assessing financial 
conditions should be adopted as the financial system evolves.  To the extent that funds 
raised in the capital markets play an important role, market-based liability figures may be 
more useful, as argued by Adrian and Shin (2007, 2008).  In the Japanese case, 
qualitative aspects in lending activities like loan standards and collateral evaluation could 
have been very indicative. 
 
Role of Prudential Policy Communication 
It will be important for the policy authorities to point to some excesses in financial 
markets and the behavior of financial institutions as part of their communication strategy.  
If market functions lack self-correcting mechanisms for certain forms of excess, active 
warnings about such excess from the policy authorities will have value.  In the case of 
Japan, in the ongoing financial liberalization, interventions by the policy authorities were 
reduced significantly.  The effectiveness of some policy measures for prudential policy 
communication such as the window guidance by the Bank of Japan, which worked as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
estate projects in addition to the aggressive behavior of real estate developers accelerated the real estate 
price appreciation.   40
moral suasion measure, decreased and there could be a larger role to be played by such 
measures. 
 
Reconsidering the effect of “Commitment” 
For both the US and Japanese cases, monetary policy easing was a factor behind the 
excesses of financial institutions and the flow of funds that backed their behavior.   
Moreover, in both instances, the monetary policy stance was assessed to be based on a 
commitment to the continuation of loose monetary policy.  The announced measured 
pace of future policy changes in the United States and the emphasis in Japan on 
increasing domestic demand as a commitment in international policy coordination 
seemed to lead to this perception.   
 
It is true that “commitment” to a future path of monetary policy helps to increase 
transparency of monetary policy, but the experiences in the United States and Japan 
discussed in this paper give us pause for thought on the desirability of commitment, 
especially on the unintended side-effects of forward-looking policy statements.  To the 
extent that such forward-looking statements reduce the uncertainty surrounding future 
central bank actions, the risk premiums will be artificially compressed relative to a 
situation in which the central bank does not issue forward-looking statements on the 
future direction of short-term policy interest rates.  
 
Role of Short Term Interest Rate for Funding Cost for Financial Institutions 
When financial intermediaries are placed explicitly in the monetary policy transmission 
through credit supply, short-term interest rates take on significance for monetary policy.  
This perspective on the importance of the short-term interest rates as a price variable is in 
contrast to current monetary thinking, where short-term interest rates matter only to the 
extent that they determine long-term interest rates, which are seen as being risk-adjusted 
expectations of future short-term interest rates.  Alan Blinder (1998, p.70) in his book on 
central banking puts it in the following terms: 
 
“central banks generally control only the overnight interest rate, an 
interest rate that is relevant to virtually no economically interesting 
transactions.  Monetary policy has important macroeconomic effects 
only to the extent that it moves financial market prices that really 
matter – like long-term interest rates, stock market values and exchange 
rates.” 
 
For this reason, current models in monetary economics emphasize the importance of 
managing market expectations.  By charting a path for future short rates and 
communicating this path clearly to the market, the central bank can influence long rates 
and thereby influence mortgage rates, corporate lending rates, and other prices that affect 
consumption and investment.  The “expectations channel” has become an important 
consideration for monetary policy, especially among those that practice inflation 
targeting.  In contrast, the role of the short-term interest rate in regulating credit supply   41
suggests that short-term interest rates have significance as a price variable in their own 
right.
16   
 
In the context of the Japan’s 1980s bubble, low short-term interest rates gave banks the 
incentive to increase deposits by using newly introduced time deposits with liberalized 
interest rates.  In a sustained environment of low short-term interest rates, banks resorted 
to maturity transformation between liabilities (deposits) and assets (loans) to increase 
their profits.  In relation with the role of commitment discussed in the last subsection, 
when an expectation emerges that short-term interest rates will remain low, there will be 
greater motivation for this behavior because the funding cost for rolling over the 
liabilities is expected to be low.  Therefore, the role of the short-term interest rate level 
and expectations about its continuation will both have a role that does not explicitly 




9.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has offered a perspective on the 1980s bubble years in Japan in the light of the 
experiences of the subprime credit boom in the United States and its subsequent 
unwinding in the current financial crisis.  The incremental contribution of our account has 
been to offer a financial system perspective with an emphasis on the supply of credit.   
 
The ingredients that make an appearance in our discussion (such as the lending to real 
estate-related sectors, the increase in lending to SMEs) have been discussed by many 
others before us.  Our contribution is to bring them together in a systems perspective.  
 
Our main argument is that as new funding sources opened up to non-financial firms, it 
became profitable for them to act as financial intermediaries by raising funding in the 
capital markets through securities, and then supplying the new funds raised to the 
banking system by means of newly introduced time deposits with liberalized interest rates.  
The financial assets of non-financial corporations increased dramatically together with 
their financial liabilities in the late 1980s.  In this way, the non-financial companies 
became  de facto financial intermediaries.  They became financial intermediaries that 
drew market-based finance and supplied financing to the banking system by holding large 
deposit claims on the banks.   
 
We have also emphasized how the boom in the stock market contributed to the lending 
boom by increasing the funding available both to financial and non-financial firms.  Thus, 
the stock market boom and the lending boom can be seen as intimately linked.  The 
financial system perspective offers many insights which may have applicability in other 
contexts. 
                                                 
16  Adrian and Shin (2008) explore these issues further.   42
Appendix 
 
Relationship between Loans to End-Users and Aggregate Balance Sheets 
 
 
There are n entities in the financial system that we will call “banks” for convenience.  We 
gather together all non-leveraged players such as mutual funds and insurance companies 
as one entity and give it the label “ 1 + n ”.  Thus, apart from entity n+1, all other entities 
are leveraged financial institutions of one sort or another.   
 
Bank i has two types of assets.  First, there are loans to end-users such as corporates or 
households.  Denote the loans by bank i to such end users as i y .  Next, there are the 
claims against other financial institutions.  Call these the “interbank” assets, although the 





ji j x π  
 
where  j x  is the total debt of bank j and  ji π is the share of bank j’s debt held by bank i.  
Since “bank” n+1 is not leveraged, we have 0 = n x .  The balance sheet identity of bank i 




ji j i x e x y + = +∑ π  
 
The left-hand side is the total assets of the bank.  The right-hand side is the sum of equity 
and debt.  Letting  [] n x x x L 1 =  and [] n y y y L 1 = , we can write in vector notation 
the balance sheet identities of all banks as 
 
x e x y + = Π +  
 
where Π is the matrix whose () j i, th entry is  ij π .  Solving for y,  
 
() Π − + = I x e y  
 







λ =  
 
Then defining Λ as the diagonal matrix with  i λ  along the diagonal, 
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() () Π − − Λ + = I I e e y  
 
where Π is the matrix of interbank liabilities.  By post-multiplying the above equation by 















M u  
 
We can sum up the rows of the vector equation above, and we have the formula in the 
text, namely that  
 




i z e y λ  
 
where  i z  is the proportion of liabilities that come from outside the intermediary sector, 
and is given by the i th row of () u I Π − . 
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